政治大學讀書及學習行動小組

【992-23】「理論」與「實際」讀書會：廣義政治學學門選讀與時事2

由伯叡作選讀導讀。之後各組員報告了時事議題，並且進行討論。

0. 育瑋的心得:

制度原本是為了成員間減少交易成本的機制，一個制度從需求的形成，到經歷拓展到每個成員，最後產生衝突，制度作出調整或者是由新的制度來取代舊有的制度，然而，在問題中，就是因為制度本身的存在也有交易成本的存在，就是因為交易成本的存在而導致衝突的形成，所以制度本身究竟是不是一個良好的解決機制，直得探討。

0. 書賢的心得:

一般而言，制度有利於降低交易成本，提高合作的效率性和便利性。然而，組織作為制度一部分的具體化，卻可能在成立之後，以維繫自身存續及保護自身利益為出發，反而背離原始的制度。此外，組織內的成員亦可能保有自身的政治意志，從而試圖改變原始制度，或者接受新的制度等。

0. 守道的心得:

    The readings this week are a great summary, or at least a great introductory of how, under the macro-framework proposed by Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984, 1998) and picked up by the Social Constructivist scholars in IR , do agents act in a social context of structure—the agent-structure problem . In Giddens’ endeavor, he tried to postulate a theory saying that emphasis should be given to neither side and that both are equally important.

    An important concept that would contribute to the understanding of the issue is a (potential) dichotomy of two human behavioral logics: the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness. Logic of consequence means humans behave with the goal of maximizing self interests and means of cost-benefit optimalization. Simply put, it is acting as homo-econimous. Logic of appropriateness is doing what is right as perceived by the society (with the goal of remaining a member of society), homo-sociologous, in other words.

    Institutional constraints on individual behavior and the benefit of decreasing transaction costs can be understood as phenomenon of the logic of appropriateness. As the logic stipulates, individuals follow social norms, rules, and shared common knowledge to do what other social members perceive to be right and appropriate. Hence, constraints are posted upon individuals in a society, and others expect such an individual to act accordingly to the shared common knowledge and norms. Individuals, when also making a decision of action, can also follow and adhere to existent social norms and rules (more so for formal institutions) and need not make comprehensive information gathering and cost-benefit calculation every time when doing so. When people enact everyday choirs and encounters, most actions are not done with comprehensive information gathering and cost-benefit calculation, most are almost reflexes, or with minimum consideration time. You follow contextual principles that keep you safe, drawn from personal experience living in the society. It saves transaction costs for both the decision-maker and other individuals in the social context.

    Logic of consequence can explain institutional change. As North identifies that interests (price or preferences) are a fundamental factor of why institutions first come into being, causes of institutional changes can also be seen in the same line. Hence, cost-benefit calculation become the forefront consideration of actions, and as North says, change comes from the marginal adjustments of existing institutional framework (p.83, 101). These adjustments may come from exogenous factors (price change), but also may be endogenous (preference change). In effect, agents choose not to follow original norms, rules, and/or share common knowledge, and do otherwise. When such an actor has better bargaining power (ie, better material capacity, authority, prestige, etc.), when other actors follow or don’t contest the change, when others also gain more, or when at least they believe that they gain or are, at least, not worst off, the change persists (implemented, spread, and finally perpetuated). Hence, when logic of consequence becomes the main consideration of behavior, or in other words, when logic of consequence trumps logic of appropriateness, institutional change is likely to happen.

    However, this raises two questions here for reconsideration. First, which logic should be the general, persistent logic most of the time? On other words, which logic is the normal one and the other the abnormal? Second, there is a problem of dichotomy of the two logics: are the two logics completely exclusive, or are they in fact complementary at times, or at all times?

    Of the first question, Robert Krasner argued in his book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999), using the two logics to decipher state actions, he came to a conclusion that states mostly act under the logic of consequence. This is contrary to the prediction of/ expectation to a stable institution—the “sovereign state”, and hence, it is an “organized hypocrisy”. However, North seems to present the other side of the argument.

    Wendt proposed a way to approach the second question, but did not get into it too much. He proposed a “two-step analysis” model that agents use the logic of consequence to calculate the options left filtered through by logic of appropriateness. But as he implies himself, this blurs the problem of causal relations (unless you see it as a constitutive relation) which is hard to prove under the positivism paradigm (as well as under post-positivism paradigms).

0. 另外，伯叡有特別設計幾個題目，希望小組員花時間思考，甚至花點時間寫下來，下次再來討論。
   0. 針對安理會授權制裁利比亞議題，探討英、法為何在這次的攻擊行動中表現得特別積極。
   0. 這次北約國家轟炸利比亞的行動中，美國未扮演戰場主導者角色，其情何在?
   0. 北約國家轟炸利比亞的行動中，美國雖未扮演戰場主導者，但仍有效的掌握戰場主動權與優勢，是否成為未來美國在美洲以外區域的國際事務處理指標?
   0. 俄國去年才與北約達成防空協議，今年確表達自2013年起，將加倍製造戰略戰術飛彈系統，其目的與防範目標為何?

決議因為多人無法配合，下周休息一次。